There are realistic and present questions, but they can be absent or absent due to the isolated relationship between the political and the cultural. Will one of them expel the other, or will doubt and suspicion remain a separate presence between them? Does the politician have superior power to marginalize the cultural? Is this cultural contented with his delusional game of transcendence over the politician and rebellion against his rhetoric sometimes? Is there room for negotiation between them, as Abdullah Al-Aroui assumes, to create space for sharing, dialogue, and reducing the dose of sensitization between them?
This ambiguous relationship remains open and controversial, but on the other hand it is governed by the effectiveness of the critical presence, not to justify what is revealed through it, or even to justify it, but to approach their complex problems, in terms of the social environment in which the political phenomenon has penetrated, and in terms of the ambiguous reading of the function of the cultural that has not been transformed, And he did not change his view of the world, because staying in language and knowledge means only imaginary stay inside the fortress / prison, just as rebellion against the fortress without knowing the world means going to the labyrinth.
This knowledge/approach means going to reveal the extent of the reality of this relationship, and the nature of its cultural references. The politician owns the land, wealth, decision, institution and power, and does not possess the knowledge that the cultural fantasizes of possessing. Which the politician possesses, especially since the culturalist still limits his function to rhetoric, as aesthetic and rhetorical, just as he devotes it through “advice” which is a jurisprudential issue, but it has no authority, as it is embodied in making ideas and texts that are a mask for that advice / message / discourse The idea/vision, which does not oblige the politician to anything, as the politician here is the tyrant, and he is the owner, and his cognitive deficiency does not mean his failure to use politics to impose his authority.
The most relevant and exciting questions in this context relate to: What should be done? Is there an option to bypass this node?
This question may seem justified, but it is demanding and realistic, and a research that may not oblige anyone to anything, but it is necessary in re-making and examining the cultural phenomenon and its platforms and industry, just as it is necessary in reconsidering the examination of the effectiveness of many political phenomena, and their relationship to development, history, identity, progress, knowledge and science, And the creation of institutions that guarantee coexistence rights, freedoms, laws and civil welfare
The cultural phenomenon has not been institutionalized, as it has remained outside the system, or part of it in the context of its existence within the usage context of governance, and its institutional and ideological system, that is, it performs the function that approaches the tools of the politician.. We do not have free institutions for this cultural, nor a free power for its uses.
This non-appropriation is a source of that cultural weakness, and its unbalanced exposure to other sources of power, but there is another problem that reveals the cultural fragility, when it exercises the function of political fabrication, or wears its mask, so it is more authoritarian in dealing with the cultural itself, and imposes its institutional authority On others, on financing cultural projects, and in a direction that devotes a form to cultural tyranny, or to cultural thought that monopolizes the system and opinion.
Ali Hassan Al-Fawwaz